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BAR BRIEFS

Howe vs. State Bar, 298 Pac. 25
Bailey vs. State Bar, 288 Pac. 433
Mills vs. State Bar, 296 Pac. 280
Irving vs. State Bar, 1 Pac. (2nd) 2
Townsend vs. State Bar, 291 Pac. 837
In re Shattuck, 279 Pac. 998
In re Winne, 280 Pac. 113
In re Cate, 279 Pac. 131
Vaughan vs. State Bar, 284 Pac. 909
Brydonjack vs. State Bar, 281 Pac. 1018
Green vs. State Bar, 82 Cal. 254
Fish vs. State Bar, 82 Cal. 616
Dudney vs. State Bar, 82 Cal. 637
Clark vs. State Bar, 82 Cal. 665
NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
Ruble vs. Nyseth: Over a period of years one 0. loaned various
sums of money to defendant. Settlement was finally made and note
and mortgage given. 0. and other mortgagees agreed to a sale of
the property, the understanding being that the proceeds should go
to the mortgagees. Such disposition was made, partly, but there was
about $757.29 in the hands of the auctioneer when garnishment was
served upon him. 0. claimed this amount, it being less than his account on the note and mortgage. HELD: That 0. had a valid and
subsisting mortgage lien upon the property and the proceeds of the
sale; that same was superior to the lien of the plaintiff on his garnishment proceeding.
Kittleson vs. Collette: Plaintiff, an auto dealer, and defendant, a
farmer, made a deal whereby defendant turned over to plaintiff a
house as part of the purchase price of a car. Shortly thereafter, defendant sold the lot on which the house stood, giving a warranty deed.
.The tenant in the house had, in the meantime, been requested to vacate,
and did so. At time of sale of the lot, mention of sale of the house was
made, but no reference thereto was placed in the deed. Plaintiff rented the house to another without defendant's knowledge. The lot was
then sold to C., with instruction that the house had been sold to plaintiff, but no mention was made in that deed. Plaintiff told various
people he owned the house, tried to sell it, and made arrangements for
moving it. Plaintiff's tenant then moved out of the house, but the
last owner of the lot moved in, without the knowledge or consent of
plaintiff or defendant. C. sold the lot to P., who, in turn, sold it
back to C. This action is for the value of the house. HELD: The
parole evidence rule applies only to parties and privies. "Where a controversy arises between a party to written contract and one who is neither a party to it nor privy to one who is the rule excluding parol
evidence to explain, modify, or contradict the writing does not apply."
Since, however, there was no time fixed for removal of the house, the
law gave the plaintiff a reasonable time to do so. The matter of reasonable time is a question for the jury. Hence, a new trial is ordered.
CHAIN STORE LICENSING
Under this heading we quoted extracts from the U. S. Supreme
Court decision in Indiana vs. Jackson, 51 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540 (September

BAR BRIEFS

1931 Bar Briefs). Since that decision questions have arisen in various
parts of the country as to whether such decision would apply merely
to mercantile establishments, as such, or whether the term included
such places as tire and accessory establishments and gasoline service
stations. By way of information, therefore, we cite some cases that
may have a bearing upon the subject:
Maxwell vs. Tea Co., 51 Sup. Ct. Rep.
Liggett vs. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105
Atkins vs. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525
Frost vs. Corporation,278 U. S. 515
Smith vs. Cahoon, 51 Sup. Ct. Rep. 582
State vs. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375
Chicago vs. Netcher, 183.IU. 104
Bailey vs. Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20
Trusler vs. Crooks, 269 U; S:.475
Bank vs. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533
American Sugar Co.. vs. Louiswna, 179 U. S. 89
Flint vs. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107
Maxwell vs. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525
Magoun vs. Trust & Say. Bank, 1.70 U. S. 283
Cargill vs. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452
Wing vs. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59
Bradley vs. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477
Theatre Co. vs. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61
Tea Co. vs. Doughton, 196 N. C. 145
Woolworth Co. vs. Harrison,156 S. E. 904
Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390
Traux vs. Corrigan,257 U. S. 312
Lockner vs. New York, 198 U. S. 45
JUDICIAL COUNCIL
The first proposal for a judicial council was presented by Judge
Burr at the 1924 annual meeting of this Association (page 38 proceedings 1924). His view was that it would be charged "with the duty
of ascertaining the state of judicial business; gathering statistical information regarding the work of the courts; examining the rules of
procedure; suggesting the necessary changes so the administration of
justice could be kept abreast of the needs; could also study the work of
the state's attorneys, sheriffs and other officials; make suggestions for
the expedition of business" etc. It could consist of "the Chief Justice
as chairman, one district judge from each district, and the President
and Secretary of the Bar Association."
This is quoted at this time, to indicate that the original plan contemplated a rather limited membership. We are convinced that a
more limited membership would add to the: effectiveness of the Council. We are equally convinced that the present method of selecting
representation from the Bar Association is preferable to one that would
designate those officially connected with the Association.
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COLLECTION RULE
The Lake Region Bar Association has adopted a rule that a filing
of $1.00 for each claim placed with a member of the Association
collection shall be paid by the party filing the claim at the time of
filing of the claim and that such .fee shall neither be contingent
a part of the collection fee to be charged if the claim is collected.

